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less than 1,000 dollars. 172 Hence, the present pattern of federal
regulation of the financial responsibility of broker-dealers is inade-
quate. More than a net capital-to-aggregate indebtedness ratio is
needed; a minimum net capital rule should be adopted. As recently
as November 22, 1964, the SEC announced that such a rule is to
be formally proposed within a short time. 17  Therefore, barring suc-
cessful opposition to its adoption, a minimum net capital require-
ment will soon exist, and adequate protection of the investing public
will be further assured.
With the adoption of a minimum net capital rule by the NASD,
the regulation of the financial responsibility of broker-dealers by
the self-regulatory bodies will likewise become adequate; the pat-
tern of regulation by the stock exchanges is already sufficient.
While adoption of the pertinent provisions of the Uniform
Securities Act is recommended, it appears unlikely that many states
will provide this further assurance of financial responsibility in the
near future. However, any concern over the lack of sufficient assur-
ances by the states is mitigated by the extensive regulation by
federal and self-regulatory bodies.
BARRY A. OsmuN
Conflicts-Most Significant Relationship Rule
Decedent, a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, purchased a ticket
in Pennsylvania from an air line, a Delaware corporation with
principal offices in Illinois, for a flight from Pennsylvania to Ari-
zona. The plane crashed while landing at a scheduled stop in
Colorado, causing the decedent's immediate death. The executor
of his estate brought an action against the air line in Pennsylvania
for breach of contract of carriage, seeking recovery under Pennsyl-
vania's law of damages which allowed recovery for decedent's
probable earnings during the period of his life expectancy.1 The
lower court sustained the contract action, but denied recovery
under Pennsylvania's law of damages, holding that the law of the
Special Study, pt. 1, at 85.
1 N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1964, p. 59, col. 5.
'See, e.g., Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 335, 191 A.2d
822, 828-29 (1963).
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place of wrong, Colorado, controlled. A Colorado statute denied
recovery for prospective earnings after death.2 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,3 reversed and
held that Pennsylvania's law of damages should govern. The court
first concluded that negligence rather than contract principles
should be applied because the contract characterization ignored the
realities of the situation. The court then overruled the state's
traditional choice of law rule for personal injuries, which required
the application of the law of the place of wrong,4 and formulated
a more flexible rule that permits analysis of the interests and policies
of the states involved in determining which jurisdiction's law should
apply.
The traditional choice of law rule for tort actions, previously
followed in Pennsylvania and embodied in the first Restatement,5
is the lex loci delicti principle that the substantive rights and liabili-
ties of the parties are determined by the law of the place of wrong.0
This rule has been justified by the vested rights doctrine,7 under
which the rights and obligations incurred under the law of the juris-
diction where the wrong occurs8 are said to vest in the parties
and follow them into any jurisdiction in which suit is brought.
The forum, or court in which suit is brought, ascertains "the place
2 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-1-9 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1960). See also
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1960), which limits
recovery to an amount not exceeding $25,000 in a cause of action based on
a wrongful act.
'416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
"See, e.g., Vant v. Gish, 412 Pa. 359, 365-66, 194 A.2d 522, 526 (1963);
Bednarowicz v. Vetrone, 400 Pa. 385, 162 A.2d 687 (1960); Rennekamp v.
Blair, 375 Pa. 620, 101 A.2d 669 (1954); Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89
A.2d 313 (1952).
SRESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934): "(1) If a cause of
action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recog-
nized in other states. (2) If no cause of action is created at the place of
wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state." See generally
GOODRICHI, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92 (4th ed. 1964).
a Ibid.
See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-92 (1935); STUMBERG, CON-
FLICT OF LAWs 8 (3d ed. 1963).
8 REsTATEFENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934): "The place of wrong
is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
alleged tort takes place."
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (Holmes, J.). "The
theory of foreign suits is that the act complained of was subject to no law
having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which,
like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever
the person be found." Id. at 126.
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where a right arose and the law that created it . . ."1 and applies
that law to the particular case, thus giving effect to a foreign created
right through the forum's law of conflicts-in this case the lex loci
delicti rule." The first Restatement recognized two exceptions to
the rule: the forum applies its own procedural rules,' 2 and the
forum applies its own law when the law of the place of wrong is
contrary to a strong public policy of the forum.'8
Because of the long-standing adherence to the predictable and
uniform rules of the first Restatement, forums are reluctant to
overrule them even when their application produces an unjust result.
To avoid abrogation of the place of wrong rule and yet reach
equitable results, some forums have devised avenues of escape,
technically within the first Restatement's rules, by which they apply
law other than that of the place of wrong. Since the first Restate-
ment recognized that the forum applied its own rules of procedure, 14
some courts seeking to avoid applying the law of the place of wrong
have characterized substantive problems before them as procedural,
and thus subject to the law of the forum.' 5 For example, one forum
characterized survival of a cause of action not as an essential
part of the cause of action, but rather as a matter of enforcement
of the claim for damages, and hence a procedural question subject
to the law of the forum.' 6 Other courts have characterized actions
10 1 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 8A.8.
' RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 1, 5 (1934).12Id. § 585. See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 124-25 (1962);
STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 7, at 133, 154-55.
" RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934). See, e.g., Gordon
v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949); Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. App.
2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (1949) (cause of action for alienation of affections
against forum's public policy); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d
34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (limitation on damages in
place of wrong against forum's public policy). See generally Paulsen &
Sovern, Public Policy in Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 969 (1956).
" See note 12 supra.
"0 See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 42, 172 N.E.2d
526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137 (1961) (damage limitation classified as
procedural; see note 13 supra for an alternative basis for applying the
forum's law). Contra, Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126
(1904) (damage limitation considered a substantive matter) ; Northern Pac.
R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894). But see Davenport v. Webb, 11
N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962) (subsequent decision
withdrawing the procedural classification in Kilberg).
1 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 866, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953).
Contra, RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390 (1934), which considers
survival of a cause of action to be a substantive matter governed by the
[Vol. 43
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essentially sounding in tort as questions of contract law to avoid
the place of wrong rule." On the other hand, some courts have
found exception to the place of wrong rule and have formulated
specific new choice of law rules in tort actions involving questions
of intrafamilial immunity from tort liability,"8 decedent's estates
law,'" and workmen's compensation, 0 in order to apply the law of a
jurisdiction other than that of the place where the wrong occurred.
For example, one forum characterized an action involving inter-
spousal immunity from tort liability as family law to be governed
by the law of the domicile of the parties, which, in this case, was
the forum.2 ' Other courts have ignored the place of wrong rule
and applied the forum's statutory liability for a certain act where
the law of the place of wrong imposed no such liability.
22
The results reached by these courts have been said to be
desirable, but the means of reaching them have been criticized.23
Many commentators have advocated abolition of the first Restate-
law of the place of wrong. For an alternative basis of McAldiffe, see note
19 infra.
"' See Dyke v. Eire Ry., 45 N.Y. 133 (1871) (personal injury action
arising out of train accident characterized as breach of contract).
8 See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (un-
emancipated minor permitted to recover from parent under law of domicile);
Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
See generally Ehrenzweig, Parental Immunity in Conflict of Laws, 23 U.
CHi. L. REv. 474 (1956) ; Ford, Intersponsal Immunity for Automobile Ac-
cidents in Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15
U. PiTT. L. REv. 397 (1954).
10 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 866, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953)
(survival of tort action is question of administration of decedent's estate
governed by law of decedent's domicile).
20 See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packer Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 294 U.S.
532 (1935).
" Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 103, 137, 95 N.W.2d 814,
818 (1959).
" See Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365
(1957) (forum's dram shop act applied to hold innkeeper liable for negligent
act occurring outside forum).
2 Commenting on his opinion in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859,
264 P.2d 944 (1953), Judge Traynor says:
It may not be amiss to add that although the opinion in the case is my
own, I do not regard it as ideally articulated, developed as it had to be
against the brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet I would
make no more apology for it than that in reaching a rational result it was
less deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar speech of
choice of law.
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TExAs L. Rav. 657, 670
n.35 (1959).
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ment's mechanical rules2 4 and the adoption of other approaches, some
emphasizing an analysis of the policies and interests of the com-
peting states,25 some the interests of the parties involved,20 and
others the significant contacts of the states with the tortious oc-
currence and the parties2 7 to determine which jurisdiction's law
applies. The latter approach has been adopted by the second Restate-
inent in place of the le% loci delicti rule.28 However, it was not until
"2 Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUm. L. REV.
959 (1952); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confiesion in New York, 1963
DuKE L.J. 1; Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 754 (1963); Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in
the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963);
Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1243
(1963); Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Re-
reading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947); Morris,
The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. REV. 881 (1951); Reese, Conflict
of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 679
(1963); Stumberg, "The Place of the Wrong": Torts and the Conflict of
Laws, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 388 (1959); Traynor, supra note 23.
"' Most critics agree that any approach to the solution of a conflicts
problem must include an analysis of the policies of the competing states, but
there is a divergence of views as to the methods to be used in analyzing the
policy interests in order to determine which state's law should be applied.
Some critics prefer to analyze the policy interests underlying the respective
laws in terms of each state's contact with the events and parties, weighing
the respective policies in light of their contacts. See Cheatham, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1229 (1963); Lefar, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1247 (1963); Weintraub, A
Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215
(1963). On the other hand, Professor Currie prefers an analysis by the forum
of its governmental interests in the issues. If the forum finds a legitimate
interest, Currie believes the forum should apply its law even if the foreign
state has a contrary interest. See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson,
63 CoLum. L. REv. 1233 (1963); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in
New York, 1963 DuxE LJ. 1.
"' Analysis of the interests of the parties in light of the forum's policy
is the solution proposed by Professor Ehrenzweig. This approach emphasizes
the interests of the defendant by applying the law of the forum if such ap-
plication will not be prejudicial to the defendant. Ehrenzweig says the pri-
mary interests the forum should consider are the ability of the defendant
to procure liability insurance adequate under the applicable law and the
ability of the insurer to reasonably calculate the premium. Ehrenzweig,
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 24.
2 This approach analyzes the competing state's contacts with the events
and parties to determine which state has the most significant relationship
to the events and parties and applies that state's law. See note 28 infra.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1964, approved May 21, 1964):
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant rela-
tionship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights
and liabilities in tort.
[Vol. 43
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1963 that a court overruled the place of wrong rule in a tort action.
In this case, Babcock v. Jackson,29 the New York Court of Appeals
formulated a jurisdiction-selecting test in which the forum analyzes
the policies of each state as expressed in their conflicting laws and
weighs the interests of each in vindicating its policy in light of its
physical contacts with the events and the parties. This test com-
bined several of the approaches that have been urged by critics to
replace the traditional rule.30
The Pennsylvania court in Griffith followed the test set forth in
Babcock. In determining that Pennsylvania's damage law applied,
the court first analyzed the interests of Colorado and the policies
behind her damage law in light of her contacts with the events and
parties. Colorado's lone contact with the occurrence was place of
wrong. The court found that the state where the wrong occurs
has no interest in compensation where, as here, death is immediate
and the site of the accident is fortuitous. In considering the policy
reasons behind the damage limitation, the court indicated Colorado's
lack of interest in the amount of recovery in a Pennsylvania court,
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining
the state of most significant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contracts, the forum
will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant pur-
poses of the tort rules of the interested states.
See Reese, supra note 24. For a criticism of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
approach, see Comment, The Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A
Caveat, 51 CALIF. L. RFv. 762 (1963).
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), 77 HARV.
L. REv. 355 (1963); 42 N.C.L. REv. 419 (1964); 49 VA. L. REV. 1362
(1962). The court allowed a New York domiciliary who was injured in
Ontario while riding as a guest passenger in a New York automobile to re-
cover against the host driver who was also a New York domiciliary, al-
though Ontario prohibits recovery by a guest against a host driver. See
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212 (1963). But cf. Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson--A
Practicing Attorney's Reflections upon the Opinion and Its Implications,
31 IN s. COuNsEL J. 428 (1964).
80 See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, supra note 29. Professor Currie, referring to the reasoning of
the Babcock court, says: "Indeed, the majority opinion contains items of com-
fort for almost every critic of the traditional system." Currie, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1233, 1234 (1963).
1965]
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because the policy behind the limitation could only be intended to
prevent Colorado courts from engaging in "speculative computation
of expected earnings"'" or to prevent large verdicts against Colorado
defendants. On the other hand, the court concluded that Pennsyl-
vania had an interest in the amount of compensation. The relation-
ship giving rise to the air line's duty to the decedent arose in
Pennsylvania, and more important, the decedent and his surviving
dependents were domiciled in that state. Because of these con-
tacts, the court considered Pennsylvania to be vitally concerned with
the administration of the decedent's estate and the well-being of
the surviving dependents to the extent of granting full recovery,
including expected earnings. 2 Finally, the court examined the
interests of the defendant and concluded that subjecting the air line
to unlimited recovery placed no undue burden on it or its insurer for
both could protect against this eventuality.
The jurisdiction-selecting rule followed in Griffith is designed
to choose the law of one state for each particular issue presented. 8
In Griffith, the issue was damages. Presumably, if asked to decide
which state's standard of care should apply, the court would look
to Colorado law because Colorado has a greater interest that Penn-
sylvania in requiring a given standard of care within its borders.
In contrast to this approach, both the first and second Restatement
rules choose the law of one state to govern all issues of the case.84
' Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 807 (Pa. 1964).
3 Pennsylvania's policy of granting full recovery is found in its constitu-
tion which prohibits the state legislature from limiting recovery for in-juries resulting in death. PA. CONST. art. III, § 21. Conceivably, the court
in Griffith could have refused to apply Colorado's damage limitation as being
against the strong public policy of the forum and thus avoided overruling
the place of wrong rule. See Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 472, 3 N.E.2d
597, 599 (1936) (public policy defined as "the law of the state, whether
found in the Constitution, the statutes or judicial records"); Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 40, 172 N.E.2d 526, 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133, 136 (1961) (damage limitation of place of wrong against forum's public
policy of allowing full recovery, defined in the forum's constitution).
"' See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963); Dym v. Gordon, 411 Misc. 2d 657, 245 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
"REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 384, (1934); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964, approved
May 21, 1964). The introductory note to § 379 of the RESTAREmENT (SEC-
OND) states that "the law selected governs all issues dealt with in Title B
(§ 3791-390g)." For example, § 380 provides that "the law selected by ap-
plication of the rule of § 379 determines the standard of care by which
the actor's conduct shall be judged."
[Vol. 43
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The latter approach arbitrarily ignores the often valid interests of
another jurisdiction in one or more issues of the case.
The underlying concept of any test that rejects the traditional
rules of conflicts seems to be that the forum will avoid, where pos-
sible, laws that deny or limit the injured party's recovery. The
Griffith test places certain limitations on such a policy. The forum
may apply the law of another jurisdiction if the forum determines
that that jurisdiction has a greater policy reason than the forum
in seeing its laws vindicated. Except where the defendant is
domiciled in the state, it is questionable if the place of wrong ever
has a policy interest in the determination of the amount of recovery,
because its policies of limiting recovery have no relationship to
the events and parties.3 5 Where the defendant is domiciled in the
place of wrong, it may have a policy interest in protecting its
domiciliary from excessive tort liability.36 On the other hand, the
place of wrong always has a greater interest in requiring a given
standard of conduct within its borders. 7 Another limitation on
the policy of allowing full recovery is the protection of the de-
fendant's personal interests. If the defendant cannot reasonably
protect against the application of the liability of the forum, the
forum may apply the law of the place of wrong. In the case of in-
terstate enterprises in general and specifically in the case of air
lines, this consideration is meaningless, for such concerns must pro-
tect against all forms of liability in all jurisdictions in which they do
business.38 Finally, the Griffith test may be used by courts to select
the law of the place of wrong where obligations, such as medical
"* Weintraub, smpra note 25, at 220, 227. See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41
Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249
Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co.,
7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
" See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,
211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (place of wrong said to have a policy interest in
limiting liability of domiciled air line). See generally Currie, Conflict,
Crisis and Confusion in New York, supra note 24. It is questionable whether
the place of wrong has an interest in protecting its domiciled corporation
when that state has no interest in protecting the defendant if the tort
occurs in another jurisdiction. Weintraub, supra note 25, at 228-29.
" Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 750-51 (1963). Referring to the issue of the defendant's
standard of care, the court said: "[I]t is appropriate to look to the law of
the place of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in
regulating conduct within its borders, and it would be almost unthinkable
to seek the applicable rule in the law of some other place." Ibid.
" EuRENZWEIG, CorFLicT OF LAws § 213 (1962).
1965]
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expenses, are incurred in that jurisdiction, because that jurisdiction
has an interest in seeing that the obligations are met. This interest
seems relevant only where application of the forum's law would
completely deny recovery, because where damage limitations are
involved some recovery is always assured if a tort has been com-
mitted; hence such obligations will be met regardless of which
state's law is applied.
The fact situation in Griffith posed an ideal situation for the
application of the forum's law. By varying the facts to bring into
play any of the limitations that may deny the use of the forum's law,
there is created what has been called a true conflicts problem
because each state has a valid interest in seeing its laws ap-
plied. 9 Under the Griffith rationale, if the forum is the domicile
of the injured party, the conflict will usually be resolved in favor
of the forum, for in balancing the interests and policies in light of
the contacts, the forum will give greater weight to its interests
and policies than those of another jurisdiction.4" But if a disin-
terested forum were to apply the same test, the balancing of the
interests and policies would be made without the emphasis on the
law of the domicile of the injured parties, and a different con-
clusion could be reached. 4
By subjecting the law of conflicts to a test that balances the
interests and policies of the states involved in order to yield a
socially desirable result, the Pennsylvania court may have opened a
"' See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, supra note 24, at 764.
Currie considers Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172
N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961), to be an example of a true conflict
problem because the forum has an interest in protecting its domiciled
plaintiff by granting full recovery and because the place of wrong has an
interest in protecting its domiciled corporation, which is also doing business
in the state, from unlimited liability. In Kilberg, a New York domiciliary
was allowed full recovery under New York law as a matter of public policy
in a wrongful death action arising out of a plane crash in Massachusetts.
The defendant air line was domiciled in Massachusetts, which limited re-
covery in wrongful death actions.
"0 See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 39. In Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962) (rehearing in banc),
reversing 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963),
the court held that the result reached in Kilberg did not violate the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution because "a state with substantial
ties to a transaction in dispute has a legitimate constitutional interest in
the application of its own rules of law." 309 F.2d at 559. Cf. Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
" See Skahill v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
[Vol. 43
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Pandora's box of judicial uncertainty. With the introduction of such
a rule, uniform treatment would not be given to a cause of action
in all jurisdictions where it might be litigated.42 Lack of uniformity
between jurisdictions encourages forum-shopping to find the juris-
diction with the most advantageous law in which to bring the ac-
tion.43 Lack of predictability and certainty lengthens courtroom
procedure through drawn-out adjudication of conflict problems.44
Instability and confusion enters the field of conflicts under such a
rule. On the other hand, the place of wrong rule totally ignores the
policy considerations behind the laws of the other jurisdictions
having contact with the occurrence. It ignores the interests of the
parties by applying the law of a jurisdiction that does not purport
to account for their interests. Furthermore, as the court in Griffith
said, the standard it used is no less clear than the concepts of reason-
ableness and due process which the courts presently employ. 5
In deciding to apply the law of the forum, the Pennsylvania court
did not avoid the traditional rules by some devious characterization . 4
It chose to overrule the place of wrong rule in favor of a new test
now followed by two jurisdictions . 4  The merits of such a test out-
weigh the place of wrong rule, which is still followed and reaffirmed
by a majority of courts, including North Carolina.4 ' The ideal
conflict of laws rule is one that is uniform and predictable and yet
produces just results. The traditional place of wrong rule is pre-
dictable and uniform, but its application often leads to unjust and
arbitrary results. The Griffith test is designed to give socially
desirable results. Although it is not uniform and certain at present,
sophisticated judicial application of the Griffith test to numerous
choice of law problems will hopefully produce sound precedents
that establish its certainty and uniformity.
RIcHARD G. ELLIOTT, JR.
"See Sparks, supra note 29, at 434-35.
,
8 Id. at 435. But see Cravers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and
the Federal Court, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 373 (1963).
"Cf. Texas v. Nev Jersey, 85 Sup. Ct. 626 (1965).
,203 A.2d at 806.
,8 For possible alternatives the Griffith court could have used to avoid
overruling the place of wrong rule, see notes 15, 17 & 32 supra.
"' Though other states have avoided the effects of the place of wrong rule,
see notes 15-22 supra, only New York and Pennsylvania have overruled it.
" See, e.g., Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963), where
the court, when asked to overrule the place of wrong rule, replied, "We
do not deem it wise to voyage into such an uncharted sea, leaving behind
well established conflict of laws rules." Id. at 616, 129 S.E.2d at 293.
